Abstract. I investigate the modal commitments of various conceptions of the philosophy of arithmetic potentialism. Specifically, I consider the natural potentialist systems arising from the models of arithmetic under their natural extension concepts, such as end-extensions, arbitrary extensions, conservative extensions and more. In these potentialist systems, I show, the propositional modal assertions that are valid with respect to all arithmetic assertions with parameters are exactly the assertions of S4. With respect to sentences, however, the validities of a model lie between S4 and S5, and these bounds are sharp in that there are models realizing both endpoints. For a model of arithmetic to validate S5 is precisely to fulfill the arithmetic maximality principle, which asserts that every possibly necessary statement is already true, and these models are equivalently characterized as those satisfying a maximal Σ 1 theory. The main S4 analysis makes fundamental use of the universal algorithm, of which this article provides a simplified, self-contained account. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the philosophical differences of several fundamentally different potentialist attitudes-linear inevitability, convergent potentialism and radical branching possibility-are expressed by their corresponding potentialist modal validities.
Introduction
Consider the models of arithmetic M under the modalities arising from their various natural extension concepts, viewing the result in each case as a potentialist system, a Kripke model of possible arithmetic worlds. The end-extension modality, for example, is defined by the operators: Other natural extension modalities include n and n , which restrict the previous to Σ n -elementary extensions, and in section 6 we shall consider the conservative end-extension modality , the computably saturated end-extension modality , and many others.
Thanks to Rasmus Blanck, Ali Enayat, Victoria Gitman, Roman Kossak, Volodya Shavrukov, and Albert Visser for insightful comments and helpful discussions. Commentary concerning this article can be made at http://jdh.hamkins.org/arithmetic-potentialism-and-the-universal-algorithm.
Ultimately, we shall consider a large variety of natural extension modalities in this article:
Each extension concept for the models of arithmetic-a way of relating some models of arithmetic to other larger models-gives rise to a corresponding extension modality and its associated potentialist system of arithmetic.
The goal is to analyze the precise modal validities exhibited by these various natural potentialist systems. For generality, let us work in the class of all models of PA + , an arbitrary fixed consistent c.e. extension of PA, with the central case being PA itself, and I shall use the phrase model of arithmetic to mean a model of this base theory PA + . Since the domains of the models are inflationary with respect to these various extensions, these are potentialist systems in the sense of [HL17] . In that article, Linnebo and I had provided a general model-theoretic framework for potentialism, using it to analyze the precise modal commitments of various kinds of set-theoretic potentialism, and the project here should be seen as an arithmetic analogue. Following this article, Woodin and I carried out an analogous project [HW17] for top-extensional potentialism in set theory.
A main result, proved in section 5, will be the following.
Main Theorem. With respect to the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA + under the end-extension modality :
(1) The potentialist validities of any M |= PA + , with respect to arithmetic assertions with parameters from M and indeed one specific parameter suffices, are exactly the modal assertions of S4.
(2) The potentialist validities of any M |= PA + , with respect to arithmetic sentences, is a modal theory containing S4 and contained in S5.
(3) Both of the bounds in (2) are sharp: there are models validating exactly S4 and others validating exactly S5 for sentences.
I shall prove similar results for the other modalities, including , , n , n , , and sections 5 and 6 have various further sharper results, including an analysis of the arithmetic maximality principle for these various extension concepts.
This theorem in part refines an earlier independent result of Volodya Shavrukov (appearing in Visser's overview of interpretability logic [Vis98, theorem 16, credited to Shavrukov]), showing that the propositional modal assertions valid for sentential substitutions simultaneously in all models of arithmetic is S4. Thus, there is a certain overlap of themes and ideas between this paper and prior work of Visser and Shavrukov on the modal logic of interpretability, and also with work of Berarducci, Blanck, Enayat, Japaridze, Shavrukov, Visser and Woodin in connection with the universal algorithm, as explained in section 3.
To explain the terminology of the theorem, let me define that a modal assertion ϕ(p 0 , . . . , p n ), with propositional variables p i , is valid at a world M for a family of assertions, if M |= ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) for any substitution of the propositional variables by those assertions p i → ψ i . Following [HL17] , let us denote by Val(M, L) the collection of propositional modal validities of a world M with respect to assertions in a language L. I shall at times use a subscript, as in Val (M, L), to indicate which modality and accessibility relation is intended.
Let me illustrate the idea by showing that the modal assertions of S4 are valid in every model of arithmetic under the end-extension modality . This is an elementary exercise in modal reasoning, which I encourage the reader to undertake. Every model of arithmetic M obeys (ϕ → ψ) → ( ϕ → ψ), since if an implication ϕ → ψ holds in every end-extension of M and also the hypothesis ϕ, then so does the conclusion ψ. Similarly, every model obeys ϕ → ϕ, since every model is an end-extension of itself. Every model obeys ϕ → ϕ, since if ϕ holds in all end-extensions, then ϕ also holds in all end-extensions, because an end-extension of an end-extension is an end-extension. And every model obeys the duality axiom ¬ ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ, since ϕ fails to hold in all end-extensions just in case ¬ϕ holds in some end-extension. Since these modal statements are precisely the axioms of S4, to be closed under modus ponens and necessitation, one concludes that S4 is valid.
It is a more severe requirement on a modal assertion ϕ(p 0 , . . . , p n ), of course, for it to be valid with respect to a larger collection of substitution instances; and so in particular, a modal assertion might be valid with respect to sentential substitutions, but not valid with respect to all substitutions by formulas with parameters. For example, the main theorem shows that some models validate S5 for sentences, but only S4 for arithmetic assertions with parameters.
It follows from the main theorem that the standard model N validates exactly S4 for sentential substitutions, since all parameters are absolutely definable in the standard model. Meanwhile, the models whose sentential validities are S5 are precisely the models of what I call the arithmetic maximality principle, which holds in a model of arithmetic M when M |= σ → σ for every arithmetic sentence σ. In other words, if a sentence σ could become true in some end-extension of M in such a way that it remains true in all further end-extensions, then it was already true in M . This holds, I prove in theorem 33, in precisely the models of arithmetic whose Σ 1 theory is a maximal consistent Σ 1 extension of the base theory PA + . Let me clarify the various formal languages that will be used in this work.
(1) The language of arithmetic L = { +, ·, 0, 1, < } is the usual language in which for example the theory PA is expressed, with expressions such as ∀x∃y (x = y + y) ∨ (x = (y + y) + 1).
(2) The language of propositional logic, in contrast, denoted P, has no arithmetic or quantifiers, but is simply the closure of propositional variables p, q, r and so on under Boolean logical connectives, with expressions such as ¬p ∨ (p → q).
(3) The language of propositional modal logic, denoted P , also allows the use of the modal operators , , having expressions such as p → (p ∧ ¬p).
(4) The (partial) potentialist language of arithmetic, denoted (L), is the closure of the language of arithmetic L under the modal operators , and under the Boolean connectives. Thus, every (L) assertion is a substitution instance ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) of a propositional modal logic assertion ϕ(p 0 , . . . , p n ) ∈ P by arithmetic assertions ψ i ∈ L, such as in the case
which is a substitution instance of the propositional modal assertion in (3).
(5) Finally, the (full) potentialist language of arithmetic, denoted L , allows all the usual constructions of the language of arithmetic plus the modal operators, as in the assertion ∀k [ Con(PA k ) → Con(PA k+1 )] .
Note that in the full potentialist language of arithmetic, the modal operators can fall under the scope of a number quantifier, while this does not occur for expressions in the partial potentialist language (L). The paper concludes in section 7 with philosophical remarks on some fundamentally different potentialist attitudes and how they are expressed in the potentialist modal validities.
Extensions of models of arithmetic
For the rest of this article, let PA + be a fixed consistent computably enumerable theory extending PA in the language of arithmetic, defined by a fixed computable enumeration algorithm, which can therefore be interpreted in any model of arithmetic. Consider the potentialist systems consisting of all the models of PA + under the various extension relations. Let PA + k be the theory fragment consisting of the axioms of PA + enumerated by stage k. These assertions will have length less than k, and so their arithmetic complexity will be less than Σ k .
My argument will use the following classical result, a generalization of the fact that PA proves Con(PA k ) for every standard finite k. This fact in turn implies that PA, if consistent, is not finitely axiomatizable, for it proves the consistency of any of its particular finite fragments.
Theorem 1 (Mostowski's reflection theorem [Mos52] ). For any standard k, the theory PA proves Con(Tr k ), where Tr k is the Σ k -definable collection of true Σ k assertions. This is a theorem scheme, with a separate statement for each k. In any model of arithmetic M |= PA, the interpretation of Tr k is the set of (possibly nonstandard) Σ k statements true in M according to the universal Σ k truth predicate, which is a definable class of M . In nonstandard models, of course, this theory can differ significantly from the Σ k theory of the standard model. Note also that even Tr 1 can include many statements that are independent of PA. It follows immediately from the theorem that PA + proves the consistency of PA + k for any standard finite k, since PA + k will be included in Tr k in any model of PA + .
Lemma 2 (Possibility-characterization lemma). In the potentialist systems consisting of the models of PA + under end-extensions or arbitrary extensions, the following are equivalent for any model M |= PA + and any assertion ϕ(a) in the language of arithmetic with parameter a ∈ M .
(1) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is true in some
This result can be seen as a version of the Orey-Hájek characterization of relative interpretability; an essentially similar observation is made by Blanck and Enayat [Bla17, theorem 6.9 ]. In section 6, we shall see that these statements are also equivalent to ϕ(a), ϕ(a), and in computably saturated models, to ϕ(a), ϕ(a), and others. In the remarks before theorem 42, we explain the analogue of lemma 2 for the Σ n -elementary modal operators n and n .
Proof. (1 → 2) Immediate, since end-extensions are extensions.
(2 → 3) Suppose that M |= ϕ(a), so that there is some extension N satisfying PA + + ϕ(a). Since every extension is ∆ 0 -elementary, it follows that Σ 1 statements true in M are preserved to N , and so N satisfies every assertion in the Σ 1 type of a in M . In other words, N |= PA + + ϕ(a) + tp M Σ1 (a), and so that theory is consistent. (3 → 4) Suppose that ϕ(a) is consistent with PA
, although N may not necessarily extend M . (I am using a to refer both to the original element of M and also to the object realizing this type in N .) For any standard finite k, we have N |= PA + k + ϕ(a), and since these have bounded standard-finite complexity, it follows by the Mostowski reflection theorem that N |= Con(PA + k + ϕ(a)). So it cannot be that the original model M satisfies ¬ Con(PA + k + ϕ(a)), for if it were, this would be a Σ 1 assertion about a that is true in M and therefore part of the type tp M Σ1 (a), which is supposed to be true in N , contrary to what was just observed.
(4 ↔ 5) For nonstandard M , the forward implication follows by overspill; the converse implication is immediate, since the statement becomes stronger as k becomes larger.
(4 → 1) First consider nonstandard M . If M thinks that PA + k +ϕ(a) is consistent for some nonstandard k, then M can complete this theory to a complete consistent Henkin theory and form the resulting Henkin model, which will be a model of PA + since all standard instances are included in the nonstandard theory fragment PA + k . It will also be a model ϕ(a), since this is in the Henkin theory. Since the model is definable in M , it follows that it will be an end-extension of M , and so PA + + ϕ(a) will be true in an end-extension of M . So M |= ϕ(a). In the case that M is the standard model N, then we get full Con(PA + + ϕ(a)), and the Henkin model again provides the desired end-extension.
In the case of an arithmetic sentence σ, with no parameter a, then the equivalence of statement (3) should be taken as the assertion that σ holds in an extension of a model M if and only if it is consistent with PA + plus the Σ 1 theory of M . The following dual version is an immediate consequence.
Lemma 3 (Necessity-characterization lemma). In the potentialist systems consisting of the models of PA + under end-extensions or arbitrary extensions, the following are equivalent for any model M |= PA + and any assertion ϕ(a) in the language of arithmetic with parameter a ∈ M .
(
for some standard finite k. I find it interesting to notice that lemma 2 shows that possibility assertions such as ϕ or ϕ, where ϕ is arithmetic, have a ∀ character rather than ∃, because they are each equivalent to the infinite conjunction of arithmetic assertions over standard k, a kind of universal statement, whereas possibility is usually thought of for Kripke models as a kind of existential statement. The point is that modelexistence assertions in this context amount to consistency, which is a ∀ assertion. Similarly, lemma 3 shows that all instances of necessity ϕ(a) and ϕ(a) for arithmetic assertions ϕ(a) are caused by Σ 1 witnessing assertions, namely, the existence of a proof of ϕ(a) from PA + k in M for some standard k. Although any true Σ 1 assertion is necessary, example 17 shows that there are statements that are not Σ 1 and not provably equivalent to any Σ 1 assertion, which can be necessary over a model of arithmetic. The lemma shows, however, that whenever this happens, it is because they are a provable consequence of a certain Σ 1 assertion that happens to be true in the model, namely, the inconsistency assertion of (4) or the proof-existence assertion of (5) in lemma 3.
Putting the two lemmas together, we arrive at the following.
Theorem 4. In the potentialist systems consisting of the models of PA + under end-extensions or arbitrary extensions, the following are equivalent for any model M |= PA + and any formula ϕ in the language of arithmetic with parameter a ∈ M .
(1) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is end-extension possibly necessary over M . (2) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is extension possibly necessary over M . (3) There is a standard finite number n such that for standard finite k the assertion Con(PA
There is a standard finite number n such that for every standard finite k the assertion Con(PA
The numbers n and k are standard.
(1 → 2) Assume that M |= ϕ(a), where ϕ ∈ L. Since implies , this means M |= ϕ(a). By lemma 3, since ϕ ∈ L, it follows that ϕ(a) is equivalent to ϕ(a), and so M |= ϕ(a), as desired.
, then there is an extension N of M with N |= ϕ(a). By lemma 3 in N , there is some standard finite n for which N |= ¬ Con(PA + n + ¬ϕ(a)). Thus, M |= ¬ Con(PA + n + ¬ϕ(a)), and since this is an arithmetic assertion, it follows by lemma 2 that M |= Con(PA + k + ¬ Con(PA + n + ¬ϕ(a))) for all standard k, establishing (3).
(3 → 1) If there is n for which all those consistency assertions are true in M , then by lemma 2 there is an end-extension in which ¬ Con(PA + n + ¬ϕ(a)) holds, making ϕ(a) true in all end-extensions of N by lemma 3.
(3 ↔ 4) Proving a statement is equivalent to inconsistency of the negated statement.
Theorem 7 shows that the equivalence of and does not continue all the way into the full potentialist languages of arithmetic L and L , and Shavrukov and Visser have proved (see remarks after question 8) that the equivalence can already break down inside (L) and (L). Consequently, in any nonstandard model of arithmetic, the induction principle fails in the potentialist languages of arithmetic. Conversely, for formulas in the language of arithmetic ϕ ∈ L, the assertion ϕ(a), which is equivalent to ϕ(a), is expressible in M, +, ·, 0, 1, N , with a predicate for the standard cut N.
Proof. If k is standard, then Con(PA + k ) holds by theorem 1, and since this is true in all extensions, we may also conclude Con(PA + k ) and Con(PA + k ). If k is nonstandard, however, then there is always an end-extension where Con(PA For the converse direction, if we have a predicate for the standard cut, then ϕ(a) and ϕ(a) are expressible, since by lemma 2, these are both equivalent to asserting Con(PA
Let me generalize theorem 5 to the Σ n -elementary extension relations. Proof. By Tr n , I mean the Σ n theory as it is defined by the universal Σ n definition. Because this theory is not c.e. when n > 1, the complexity of the consistency assertion Con(Tr n +PA + k ) will generally rise to Π n+1 . Note that reference is made to Tr n by its definition, and so this expression is in effect re-interpreted in the extensions of M for the purpose of evaluating the modal assertion in M . If k is standard, then we get Con(Tr n +PA + k ) in M and its extensions by the Mostowski reflection theorem (theorem 1). Conversely, suppose that k is nonstandard in M . It suffices to find a Σ n -elementary end-extension of M in which the theory Tr n +PA + k is inconsistent. We may assume Tr n +PA Although lemma 2 shows that ϕ(a) is equivalent to ϕ(a) when ϕ is an assertion in the language of arithmetic, let me now prove that this does not extend to formulas ϕ in the full potentialist language of arithmetic.
Theorem 7. There is a model of arithmetic M |= PA + and a sentence σ ∈ L in the potentialist language of arithmetic, such that M |= σ ∧ ¬ σ.
Proof. The sentence σ will assert that the halting problem is in the standard system of the model. This is expressible in either of the languages L or L , because in these potentialist languages, we can refer to the standard cut. Specifically, take σ to be the assertion ∃h∀e∈N (e ∈ h ↔ ∃s∈N ϕ e,s (e)↓), which can be translated in the potentialist language as
Since the modality here is applied only to arithmetic assertions, it doesn't matter whether we use or , since they are equivalent for this case.
Since PA + is a consistent c.e. theory, it has a model M whose elementary diagram is low and therefore does not have the halting problem 0 ′ in SSy(M ). Therefore also every end-extension of M will fail to have 0 ′ in its standard system, and so M |= σ. Yet, a simple compactness argument finds an elementary extension M ≺ N with 0 ′ ∈ SSy(N ), and so M |= σ.
So the two modalities and are not always identical when applied to assertions in the full potentialist language of arithmetic. The sentence σ used in the proof of theorem 7 is in the potentialist language L , but not in the partial language (L), because it has modal operators appearing under the scope of number quantifiers. Therefore it is natural to inquire exactly where the difference between and first arises, and in particular, whether their equivalence in the language of arithmetic L extends into the partial potentialist languages (L) and (L). This question has been answered negatively by Visser and Shavrukov. In a reported 2016 email exchange, Visser proved the existence of separating sentences as an abstract consequence of [Vis15] , and Shavrukov proved specifically that there is an arithmetic sentence ϕ and a model of arithmetic M satisfying both ¬ϕ and ϕ. Similar questions arise with essentially all of the modal operators appearing in this article, such as , , , and all the others. Exactly how much do all these modal operators agree? When they do disagree, at what level of complexity of assertions do the disagreements begin to show up?
Let me generalize the idea behind the proof of theorem 7 to show that actually arithmetic truth for the standard model is expressible in the language of extensionalpotentialist arithmetic. Indeed, even projective truth is expressible.
Theorem 9. The standard truth predicate for the standard model N is definable by a formula in the extension-potentialist language of arithmetic L .
Proof. The standard truth predicate is unique and we can always add it to the standard system of a suitable extension. So we can define it in the modal language by saying Tr(x) holds if and only if x is standard and it is possible that there is a number t coding the standard truth predicate in the standard system, and x ∈ t. To say that a number t codes the standard truth predicate in the standard system is expressible by a single property about t in the potentialist language, since the standard cut is definable in the potentialist language, and so we can say that the set coded by t obeys the Tarskian recursion for truth in the standard model. Let me push the idea much harder. In fact, projective truth, which is to say, second-order truth over the standard model of arithmetic N, is expressible in the potentialist language of arithmetic in any model of arithmetic.
Theorem 10. Projective truth (second-order arithmetic truth) is expressible in the potentialist language of arithmetic L . That is, for every projective formula ϕ(x), there is a formula ϕ * (x) ∈ L such that for any model of arithmetic M |= PA + any real a ∈ SSy(M ), coded byā ∈ M , the projective assertion ϕ(a) holds if and only if M |= ϕ * (ā).
In particular, the potentialist language for can express whether a given binary relation is well-founded, whether there is a transitive model of ZFC, whether 0 ♯ exists, whether x ♯ exists for every real x, whether ω 1 is inaccessible in L, whether there is a transitive model of ZFC with a proper class of Woodin cardinals, and more. The full potentialist language of arithmetic for the modality, therefore, is a very strong language, refuting what might otherwise have been a natural initial expectation that arithmetic potentialists generally have only a comparatively weak capacity to express arithmetic truth.
Proof. The idea is to replace quantification over the reals ∃x with potentialist number quantification ∃h, regarding the number h as coding a real in the standard system, so that we replace further references to k ∈ x with k ∈ h, for standard k, and replace all number quantifiers with quantifiers over the standard part of the model, as in the previous theorem. The point is that by compactness any real can be added to the standard system of a model by moving to a suitable extension, even an elementary extension, and so quantifying over reals is the same as quantifying over the possible reals that could be coded in the standard system of the model. The result may be connected with the main result of [Vis15] , which shows that the collection of possibly necessary sentences over PA is Π In other words, in the extension-potentialist language L , can we define a formula equivalent to ϕ(x)?
Question 13. Is expressible from ?
Perhaps cannot define truth in the standard model, for abstract reasons. For example, perhaps every L -definable set is computable from the oracle 0 (ω) , which would mean that projective truth would not be L expressible, leading to the conclusion that is not expressible from . I am not sure.
Similar questions arise with essentially all the other modalities considered in this article. There is plenty of work here to occupy all of us for the future.
The universal algorithm
The universal algorithm is an absolutely beautiful result due to W. Hugh Woodin, upon which much of the modal analysis of this article is based. The main fact is that there is a Turing machine program that can in principle enumerate any desired finite sequence of numbers, if only it is run in the right universe; and furthermore, in any model of arithmetic, one can realize any desired further extension of the enumerated sequence by moving to a taller model of arithmetic end-extending the previous one.
It is convenient to use an enumeration model of Turing computability, by which we view a Turing machine program as providing a means to computably enumerate a list of numbers. We start a program running, and it generates a list of numbers, possibly empty, possibly finite, possibly infinite, possibly with repetition.
The history of the universal algorithm result involves several instances of independent rediscovery of closely related or essentially similar results, alternative arguments and generalizations. Woodin's theorem appears in [Woo11] , with further results and discussion by Blanck and Enayat [BE17; Bla17], including especially their extension of the result from countable to arbitrary models, as well as in a series of my blog posts [Ham16; Ham17a; Ham17b] , the last of which provides a simplified proof of the theorem, which I provide below. It turns out that Volodya Shavrukov had advanced an essentially similar argument in an email message (February 16, 2012) to Ali Enayat and Albert visser, under the slogan, "On risks of accruing assets against increasingly better advice." Shavrukov has pointed out that this argument is closely related to and can be seen as an instance of the construction of Berarducci in [Ber90] , with Woodin's construction similarly seen (after the fact) as a certain instance of the general Berarducci-Japaridze [Jap94] construction, a relation of part to whole, he says, "a curious instance of the part growing more glamorous than the whole," in light of the broad appeal of Woodin's theorem. Albert Visser has pointed out a similar affinity between the universal algorithm and the classical proof-theoretic 'exile' argument (for example, see 'refugee' in [AB04] ), for the universal algorithm is allowed to succeed at stage n exactly when it finds a particular kind of proof that this will not be the last successful stage, just as the exile is allowed to enter a country only when he can also prove that he will eventually move on. Weaker incipient forms of the result are due to Mostowski [Mos60] and Kripke [Kri62] . Meanwhile, in current joint work, Woodin and I have provided a set-theoretic analogue of the result in [HW17] , and in current work with myself, Philip Welch and Kameryn Williams [HWW] , we have a Σ 1 -definable analogue for the constructible universe and for models of ZFC − .
Theorem 14 (Woodin) . Suppose that PA + is a consistent c.e. theory extending PA. Then there is a Turing machine program e with the following properties.
(1) PA proves that the sequence enumerated by e is finite.
(2) For any model M of PA + in which e enumerates a finite sequence s, possibly nonstandard, and any t ∈ M extending s, there is an end-extension of M to a model N |= PA + in which e enumerates exactly t. Proof. This is my simplified argument, which as I mentioned is essentially similar to Shavrukov's independent argument. I shall describe an algorithm e that enumerates a sequence of numbers, releasing them in batches at successful stages. Stage n is successful, if all earlier stages are successful and there is a proof in a theory fragment PA + kn , with k n strictly smaller than all earlier k i for i < n, of a statement of the form, "it is not the case that program e enumerates the elements of the sequence s at stage n as its last successful stage" where s is some explicitly listed sequence of numbers. In this case, for the first such proof that is found, the algorithm e adds the numbers appearing in s to the sequence it is enumerating, and then continues, trying for success in the next stage. The existence of such a program e, which iteratively searches for such proofs about itself, follows from the Kleene recursion theorem.
Since the numbers k n are descending as the algorithm proceeds, there can be only finitely many successful stages and so the program will enumerate altogether a finite sequence. So statement (1) holds.
If stage n is successful, it is because of a certain proof found using axioms from the theory PA + kn . I claim that k n must be nonstandard. The reason is that if n is the last successful stage and k is any standard number, then by the Mostowski reflection theorem (theorem 1), the theory Tr k is consistent, and for k ≥ 2 this would include the assertion that e enumerated exactly the sequence that it did enumerate in M with exactly those stages being successful. So there can be no proof from PA + k in M that this was not the case. So every k n is nonstandard. In particular, if PA + is true in the standard model N, then there can be no successful stages there. In this case, program e enumerates the empty sequence in the standard model N, fulfilling statement (3).
For the extension property of statement (2), suppose that M |= PA + and program e enumerates the (possibly nonstandard) finite sequence s in M and t is an arbitrary finite sequence in M extending s. Let n be the first unsuccessful stage of e in M . I may assume M is nonstandard by moving to an elementary end-extension if necessary. Let k be any nonstandard number in M that is smaller than all k i for i < n. Since stage n was not successful, there must not be any proof in M from PA + k refuting the assertion that n is the last successful stage and enumerates exactly the rest of the elements of t beyond s at stage n. In other words, M must think that it is consistent with PA + k that e does have exactly n successful stages and enumerates exactly the rest of t at stage n. If T is the theory asserting this, then we may build the Henkin model of T inside M , and this model will provide an end-extension of M to a model N that satisfies PA + k in which e enumerates exactly the sequence t altogether. Since k is nonstandard, the theory PA + k includes the entire standard theory PA + , and so I have found the desired extension to fulfill statement (2). Statement (4) follows from statements (2) and (3).
Let me now describe an alternative related algorithm, what I call the one-at-atime universal algorithm. Namely, programê will enumerate a finite sequence of numbers a 0 , a 1 and so on, adding just one number at each successful stage, but only finitely many numbers will be enumerated. The number a n is defined, if the earlier numbers have already been enumerated and there is a proof from PA + kn , with k n strictly smaller than k i for i < n, of a statement of the form, "programê does not enumerate number a at stage n as a n as its next and last number." Since the k n are descending, there will be only finitely many numbers enumerated. Ifê enumerates s in M |= PA + , then by the Henkin theory argument, we can add any desired next number as a n in some end-extension N of M , with only that number added, where n was the first undefined number in M . In other words, for the one-at-a-time universal algorithm, we weaken the extension property of statement (2) to achieve only that the sequence can be extended to add any desired next number (only one), rather than an arbitrary sequence of numbers. Indeed, the one-at-a-time algorithm e will not have the full extension property, since once a 0 is defined, then the total length of the enumerated sequence will be bounded by k 0 , and so we cannot extend to arbitrary nonstandard lengths.
Nevertheless, the one-at-a-time universal algorithm is fully general, in the sense that we can interpret the individual numbers on its sequence each as a finite sequence of numbers, to be concatenated. That is, from the enumerated sequence a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n we derive a corresponding concatenated sequence s 0 s 1 · · · s n , where s k is the finite sequence coded by a k . One thereby easily achieves the full extension property for this derived sequence, since if you can always add any desired individual next number a n+1 to the sequence enumerated byê, then you can always add any desired (possibly nonstandard) finite sequence s n+1 to the derived concatenated sequence. Indeed, this is exactly how the universal algorithm is derived from the one-at-a-time universal algorithm. In this way, one sees that the full extension property reduces to the one-at-a-time extension property and indeed the two notions are essentially equivalent, in the sense that we can transform any oneat-a-time universal sequence into a fully universal sequence. Meanwhile, in certain circumstances the one-at-a-time sequence is simpler to consider.
Statement (3) of theorem 14 generalizes to the following.
Theorem 15. In any model M |= PA + that thinks PA + is Σ 1 -sound, the universal algorithm e of the proof of theorem 14 enumerates the empty sequence.
Proof. If e has a successful stage in M , then it has a last successful stage n, and this stage is successful because of a certain proof in M that e does not have exactly that many successful stages, enumerating exactly some explicitly listed sequence s at stage n. But of course, M does have proofs that the stages up to and including n are successful and that it enumerates exactly the sequences that it does enumerate at those stages, since such proofs can be constructed from the actual computation itself in M . It follows that in M , there is a proof that stage n + 1 will be successful, even though it won't actually be successful in M . This is a Σ 1 assertion that is provable from PA + in M but not true in M , and so the theory is not held to be
Of course, Σ 1 -soundness is a strengthening of Con(PA + ), and in any model of ¬ Con(PA + ) the algorithm will find proofs and therefore have a successful stage. Blanck and Enayat [BE17] prove that their version of the universal algorithm, as well as Woodin's original algorithm, has the property that it enumerates a nonempty sequence if and only if ¬ Con(PA + ). It seems that the argument can be made to work also for the algorithm here.
I find it interesting to consider theories such as the following. By the Gödel-Carnap fixed point lemma, there is a sentence σ asserting "the universal algorithm e, relative to the theory PA + = PA + σ, has at least one successful stage." If this theory were inconsistent, then there would be abundant proofs found from it in the standard model, and so the statement would be true in the standard model, contrary to assumption. So the theory is consistent. But it cannot actually be true in the standard model, since in that case the algorithm e would have to have no successful stages in N by statement (3) of theorem 14, contrary to the presumed truth of σ in N. Note that this theory has no models in which the algorithm is never successful, because that is precisely what σ asserts not to occur.
Corollary 16. Let e be the universal algorithm of theorem 14. Then
(1) For any infinite sequence of natural numbers a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , there is a model M of PA + in which program e enumerates a nonstandard finite sequence extending it.
(2) If M is any model of PA + in which program e enumerates some (possibly nonstandard) finite sequence s, and S is any M -definable infinite sequence extending s, then there is an end-extension of M satisfying PA + in which e enumerates a sequence starting with S.
Proof. For statement (1), fix the sequence a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . . By a simple compactness argument, there is a model M of PA + in which program e enumerates exactly a n as its n th element. For statement (2), if e enumerates s in M , a model of PA + , and S is an M -infinite sequence definable in M and extending s, then apply such a compactness argument inside M using a nonstandard fragment PA Observation 17. There is a statement ψ that is independent of PA and not provably equivalent to any Σ 1 assertion, such that ψ can become necessarily true in all end-extensions of a model of PA.
Proof. Let ψ be the assertion, "the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm e for the theory PA does not begin with the number 17." This statement is independent of PA, since theorem 14 shows that there are models in which it is true and models in which it is false. It is a Π 1 assertion, since the negation asserts that the sequence does begin with 17, which is a Σ 1 assertion; and it cannot be provably equivalent to any Σ 1 assertion, since it is true in any model where the universal sequence is empty, but false in an end-extension where the universal algorithm sequence does begin with 17. In any model M where the universal sequence is nonempty but does not begin with 17, however, then ψ is necessary, since in no end-extension will it begin with 17 if it didn't already. So there are models with M |= ψ even though ψ is not provably Σ 1 .
In confirmation of my remarks after lemma 3, however, note that in the model M where ψ holds, there is a Σ 1 statement that provably implies ψ, namely, the assertion that the universal algorithm is not empty and begins with something other than 17.
3.1. Generalization to Σ n -elementary end-extensions. I would like now to generalize the universal algorithm argument to the case of Σ n -elementary endextensions. I shall use this theorem when analyzing the potentialist validities of n and n in section 6. Theorem 18. Suppose that PA + is a consistent c.e. theory extending PA, and n is any standard-finite natural number. Then there is an oracle Turing machine programẽ with the following properties.
(1) PA proves that the sequence enumerated byẽ, with any oracle, is finite.
(2) For any model M of PA + in whichẽ, using oracle 0 (n) of M , enumerates a finite sequence s, possibly nonstandard, and any t ∈ M extending s, there is a Σ n -elementary end-extension of M to a model N |= PA + in whichẽ, with oracle 0 (n) of N , enumerates exactly t. Proof. I modify the proof of theorem 14 by searching for proofs not in PA + but in the theory Tr n +PA + , where Tr n is the theory of Σ n truth, which is computable from the oracle 0 (n) . This theory is of course no longer computably enumerable, but it is uniformly computable for standard n from the oracle 0 (n) in any model of arithmetic.
So the universal programẽ here searches for a proof in Tr n +PA + k , using the oracle 0 (n) to get access to Tr n and insisting on a strictly smaller fragment k each time (while n is fixed), that programẽ, when equipped with oracle 0 (n) , does not enumerate a certain specifically listed sequence of numbers, and when found, it enumerates that sequence anyway.
The proof of theorem 14 adapts easily to this new context. Since the theory fragment PA + k is descending, there will be only finitely many successful stages and so the enumerated sequence will be finite. For the extension property, suppose that the programẽ enumerates a sequence s in a model M |= PA + , with stage m the first unsuccessful stage, and that t is a finite extension of s in M . All the numbers k i for i < m, if any, are nonstandard by the same argument as before, appealing to the Mostowski reflection theorem. Let k be any nonstandard number smaller than k i for i < m. Since stage m was not successful, there is no proof in M from Tr n +PA + k that stage m is the last successful stage, enumerating the rest of t beyond s. Thus, this theory is consistent in M , and so by considering the Henkin theory, we get a model N of PA + k in whichẽ, using oracle 0 (n) of the new model, enumerates exactly t. Note that because N satisfies the theory Tr n as defined in M , it follows that this is a Σ n -elementary end-extension M ≺ Σn N , and so the oracle 0 (n) as defined in N agrees with the oracle as defined in M . So the earlier part of the computation ofẽ is the same in M as in N . And since k is nonstandard, N is a model of PA + . So we've found the desired extension.
So far, this gives a separateẽ for each n, but actually,ẽ can check which n it is using by consulting the oracle, because there is a program which on input 0 with oracle 0 (n) outputs n. So we can have a single programẽ that works uniformly with all n.
Theorem 18 was observed independently by Rasmus Blanck [Bla18] .
3.2. Applications of the universal algorithm. I should like briefly to explain a few applications of the universal algorithm. It turns out that several interesting classical results concerning the models of arithmetic can be deduced as immediate consequences of the universal algorithm result.
For example, the universal algorithm easily provides a infinite list of mutually independent Π 0 1 -assertions. The existence of such a family was first proved by Mostowski [Mos60] and independently by Kripke [Kri62] . Some logicians have emphasized that the universal algorithm provided in corollary 16 should be seen as a consequence of the independent Π 0 1 -sentences.
1 To my way of thinking, however, we should view the implication more naturally in the other direction, in light of the easy argument from the universal algorithm to the independent Π 0 1 sentences:
Theorem 19. There are infinitely many mutually independent Π 0 1 sentences η 0 , η 1 , η 2 , and so on. Any desired true/false pattern for these sentences is consistent with PA.
Proof. Let η k be the assertion that k does not appear on the universal sequence, meaning the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm e of theorem 14 using the theory PA. Since the universal sequence is empty in N, these statements are all true in the standard model. Since the extension property of the universal sequence and its consequence in corollary 16 allows us to find an end-extension N of any given model M that adds precisely any desired additional numbers to the sequence, we can make the η k become true or false in any desired combination.
The negations of these sentences form a natural independent family of buttons. A button in a Kripke model is a statement ρ for which ρ holds in every world. The button is pushed in a world where ρ holds, and otherwise unpushed. A family of buttons is independent, if in any model, any of the buttons can be pushed in a suitable extension without pushing the others.
Theorem 20. There are infinitely many Σ 0 1 sentences ρ 0 , ρ 1 , ρ 2 , and so on, which form an independent family of buttons for the models of PA under end-extension, unpushed in the standard model. Indeed, for any M |= PA and any I ⊆ N coded in M , there is an end-extension N of M such that N |= ρ k for all k ∈ I, and otherwise the truth values of ρ i are unchanged from M to N for i / ∈ I.
Proof. Let ρ k be the assertion that k appears on the universal finite sequence. In the standard model, no numbers appear on that sequence, and in a suitable endextension, any number or coded set of numbers can be added without adding any others.
Next, consider the case of Orey sentences [Ore61] . An Orey sentence is a sentence σ in the language of arithmetic, such that every model of PA has end-extensions where σ is true and others where σ is false. In other words, an Orey sentence is a switch in the Kripke model consisting of the models of PA under end-extension, a sentence σ for which σ and ¬σ are true in every model of PA. A switch in a Kripke model is a statement that can be turned on and off from any world by moving to a suitable accessible world.
The universal algorithm easily provides numerous Orey sentences and indeed infinitely many independent Orey sentences. See also [Bla17, corollary 7.11].
Theorem 21. There is an infinite list of mutually independent Orey sentences, or switches, in the language of arithmetic. That is, there are sentences σ 0 , σ 1 , σ 2 , and so on, such that for any model of arithmetic M |= PA + and any desired pattern of truth for any finitely many of those sentences, there is an end-extension N |= PA + in which that pattern of truth is realized. Indeed, for any I ⊆ N in the standard system of M , there is an end-extension N of M such that N |= σ k for exactly k ∈ I.
Proof. Let σ k assert simply that the k th binary digit of the last number on the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm is 1. This is a Σ 2 assertion, with the main cause of complexity being that one must assert that one has the last number on the universal sequence. Since theorem 14 allows us to arrange in an endextension that any desired number appears as the last number on the sequence, we can therefore arrange any particular desired pattern for finitely many of its binary digits. Similarly, for any set I ⊆ N coded in the model, we can arrange in some end-extension that the binary digits of the last number on the universal sequence conform with I, thereby ensuring that σ k holds for exactly the k in I, as desired.
We may similarly use the universal sequence to derive the "flexible" formula result of Kripke [Kri62] . This was also observed by Rasmus Blanck [Bla18] . Here, I also achieve a uniform version of the result in statement (2).
Theorem 22.
(1) For every n ≥ 2, there is a Σ n formula σ(x) such that for any model of arithmetic M and any Σ n formula φ(x), there is an end-extension N of M such that N |= ∀x σ(x) ↔ φ(x). (2) Indeed, there is a computable sequence of formulas σ n (x) for n ≥ 2, with σ n having complexity Σ n , such that for any model of arithmetic M and any sequence of formulas φ n coded in M , with φ n of complexity Σ n , there is an end-extension N of M with N |= ∀x σ n (x) ↔ φ n (x) for all n ≥ 2.
Proof. For statement (1), let σ(x) = Φ n (k, x), where k is the last element of the universal finite sequence and Φ n (k, x) is a fixed universal Σ n formula, meaning that every Σ n formula arises as a section of it for some fixed k. The assertion σ(x) as complexity Σ n , if n ≥ 2, since σ(x) ↔ ∃k Φ n (k, x) ∧ "k is the final element of the universal sequence." Since we can arrange that the final element of the universal sequence is any desired k in a suitable end-extension N of M , we can make σ(x) agree with any desired Σ n formula. For the uniform result, simply let σ n (x) = Φ n (k n , x), where k n is the n th element of the finite sequence added at the last successful stage of the universal sequence. Since we can find an end-extension where the final stage of the universal sequence adds any desired coded sequence, we can arrange that it picks out the indices of the formulas φ n , thereby obtaining the uniform flexibility property as desired. Theorem 23.
(1) For any n, there is an infinite list of independent buttons for Σ n -elementary end-extensions of models of arithmetic. That is, there are statements ρ 0 , ρ 1 , ρ 2 , and so on, of complexity Σ n+1 in the language of arithmetic, such that for any M |= PA and any I ⊆ N coded in M , there is an end-extension N of M with N |= ρ k for all k ∈ I and otherwise the truth values of ρ i are unchanged from M to N . (2) For any n, there is an infinite list of independent switches for Σ n -elementary end-extensions of models of arithmetic. That is, there are sentences σ 0 , σ 1 , σ 2 , and so on, of complexity Σ n+2 in the language of arithmetic, such that for any model of arithmetic M |= PA + and any desired pattern of truth I ⊆ N in the standard system of M , there is a Σ n -elementary end-extension M ≺ Σn N |= PA + in which that pattern of truth is realized: N |= σ k precisely for k ∈ I. (3) For any n and any m ≥ n + 2, there is a 'flexible' Σ m formula σ(x), one for which for every model of arithmetic M |= PA + and any Σ m formula φ(x), there is a Σ n -elementary end-extension N for which N |= ∀x σ(x) ↔ φ(x).
Proof. For statement (1), let ρ k be the assertion that k appears on the universal finite sequence enumerated by the algorithmẽ of theorem 18, using oracle 0 (n) . This is a Σ 0 n+1 assertion: one asserts that there is a computation, using the correct oracle, showing a stage at which k appears on the sequence. Since the sequence is empty in the standard model, these statements are all false there, and they are possibly necessary with respect to n , since once k appears on the sequence, it remains on the sequence in all further Σ n -elementary end-extensions. Since any specific number can be added to the sequence, and indeed any coded set of numbers, with no others, these form an independent family of buttons.
For statement (2), let σ k be the assertion that the k th binary digit of the last number enumerated by algorithmẽ of theorem 18, using oracle 0 (n) , is one. The complexity of this assertion is Σ n+2 . Since theorem 18 shows that we can arrange that this last number is whichever number we want in a Σ n -elementary endextension, we can therefore arrange the pattern of truth for the σ k to be as desired, for any pattern I coded in M .
For statement (3), simply adapt the proof of theorem 22. Let σ(x) = Φ m (k, x), where k is the final element of the universal Σ n -sequence and argue as before, but with Σ n -elementary end-extensions.
One can adapt statement (1) to models of PA + , if one allows the buttons to have parameters, and indeed, the only parameter needed would be the length u of the universal sequence in a given base model of PA + , for then one takes ρ n as the assertion that n appears on the sequence after u. If N |= PA + , then no parameters are needed, and in any case, no parameters are needed in the switches σ k .
The following theorem follows from a classical result due to Wilkie [Wil75] . Let me review some of the basics here, following [HL17] . A potentialist system is a Kripke model of first-order structures in a common language, whose accessibility relation refines the substructure relation, so that if world M accesses world N , then M is a substructure of N . Here, I am concerned with the potentialist systems consisting of the models of PA or of PA + under the various natural accessibility relations: extension, end-extension, Σ n -elementary extension and so on.
In any potentialist system M, an assertion ϕ(p 0 , . . . , p n ) in the propositional modal language P , with propositional variables p i , is valid at a world M for a collection S of assertions, if M |= ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) for every possible substitution p i → ψ i of those propositional variables by assertions ψ i ∈ S. The validity concept makes sense for assertions ϕ(p 0 , . . . , p n ) in the propositional potentialist language L (p 0 , . . . , p n ), equipping L with propositional variables, although it is common to focus on the propositional modal language P , where the resulting modal theory might be one of the well-known theories.
As I mentioned in the introduction, the modal theory S4 is obtained from the
p and (Duality) ¬ p ↔ ¬p, by closing under necessitation, tautologies and modus ponens. This modal theory, as noted there for the end-extension relation, is easily seen to be valid in every potentialist system with respect to any collection of assertions. It is also easy to see that the converse Barcan formula ∀x p → ∀x p is valid in all potentialist systems, having substitution instances
The modal theory S4.2 arises by augmenting S4 with the axiom (.2) p → p, which is valid in any Kripke model whose accessibility relation is directed. The modal theory S4.3 arises by including the axiom (.
, which is valid in any linearly ordered frame. The modal theory S5 arises by augmenting S4 with the axiom (5) p → p. Modal logicians are familiar with the elementary fact that S5 is valid in a Kripke frame F , meaning that it is valid in all Kripke models having F as its underlying accessibility relation, if and only if F is an equivalence relation.
But I should like to emphasize that potentialism is not really about this kind of frame semantics, since we are studying natural Kripke models, such as those arising from the models of arithmetic, and they come along with their accessibility relations, such as they are; we shall not be constructing other Kripke models upon those same frames. It can definitely happen that a Kripke model validates S5, without its frame being an equivalence relation. For example, this is true in the potentialist system consisting of all extensions of a fixed model of the arithmetic maximality principle.
For the potentialist systems under consideration in this article, it is generally easy to observe that a given modal theory is valid, in the systems in which it is valid. In this sense, lower bounds are cheaply found. Meanwhile, what is usually much more difficult is to establish upper bounds on the modal validities of a system. For example, in the main theorem of this article, I will show that the validities of arithmetic potentialism are exactly S4. It was an easy exercise to show that S4 is valid; what is much harder is to show that no modal assertion outside S4 is valid. And similar issues with the upper bounds arise in essentially all the results of section 5.
Regarding upper bounds on the modal validities, a principal advance of my work with Benedikt Löwe [HL08] , further developed in [HLL15] and used in [HL17] , was the observation that one can often place upper bounds on the modal validities of a system by observing that it admits certain kinds of easily-understood control statements, such as switches, buttons, ratchets and railyards. Because these control statements concern only the worlds in the potentialist system and are stated in the object language L, rather than in the modal language, in practice one can often thereby determine the modal validities of a system by using expertise only in the theory of those structures, rather than expertise in modal logic.
A statement σ is a switch in a Kripke model W, if σ and ¬σ are true at every world of W. A collection of switches σ i is independent, if every world can access another world realizing any desired finite on/off pattern for those switches.
Theorem 26. If W is Kripke model and world W admits arbitrarily large finite collections of independent switches, then the propositional modal assertions valid at W are contained in the modal theory S5, with respect to the language in which the switches are expressed.
Proof. This idea goes back to [HL08] (see also [HLL15] ), and it is proved explicitly in [HL17, theorem 3]. For completeness, let me review the essential idea. If a statement ϕ(p 0 , . . . , p n ) is not part of S5, then it fails in some finite propositional Kripke model M whose underlying frame is the complete relation, where all worlds access all others, and each world w ∈ M gives truth values to the propositional variables p i . By duplicating worlds, if necessary, I may assume that there are 2 m worlds in M . Let σ i be a family of m independent switches in W. For each t < 2 m , let Φ t assert that the pattern of switches conforms with the binary digits of t. This provides a partition of the worlds of W into 2 m classes, corresponding 
This statement is true at a world W in W if and only if W corresponds to a world t in M at which p holds. By induction, one can now establish that
whenever W is a world in W corresponding to node t in M , which is to say that W |= Φ t . In this way, truth in the propositional Kripke model M is simulated in the Kripke model W. In particular, since ϕ failed at a world of M , it follows that ϕ(ψ p0 , . . . , ψ pn ) fails at a world of W, and so ϕ is not valid in W. So the modal validities of W are contained within S5.
In practice, another convenient way to handle independent switches is with the concept of a dial, which is a sequence of statements d 0 , . . . , d n , such that every world satisfies exactly one of the statements and every world can access a world in which any desired one of the dial statements is true. So from any world, you can set the dial to any value that you like, by moving to a suitable accessible world. By considering the binary digits of the dial indices, it is not difficult to see that a Kripke model W admits arbitrarily large finite collections of independent switches if and only if it admits arbitrarily large finite dials (see [HL17, theorem 4]). We therefore conclude:
Theorem 27. If W is Kripke model and world W admits arbitrarily large dials, then the propositional modal assertions valid at W are contained in the modal theory S5, with respect to the language in which the dials are expressed.
Further such connections between modal logics and control statements are provided in [HLL15] . For example, if a potentialist system admits arbitrarily large families of independent buttons and switches, then the modal validities are contained within S4.2; if the system admits a long ratchet, then the validities are contained within S4.3; if it admits arbitrarily large independent families of weak buttons and switches, then the validities are contained within S4.tBA; and so on with other instances.
Let me now introduce and consider here the concept of a railway switch, which is a statement r such that r and ¬r at a world where it is not yet switched, but becomes switched when r or ¬r holds. The train goes one way or the other, but afterwards, it is too late to change tracks.
More generally, a railyard is an assemblage of such railway switches. Specifically, if W is a Kripke model of possible worlds and T is a finite pre-tree, such as the one pictured figure 2, then a railyard labeling for T , or a T -labeling in the terminology of [HLL15] , based at world W is an assignment t → r t of the nodes of the tree t ∈ T to assertions r t in the language of the worlds of W, such that every world of W satisfies exactly one of the statements r t , the original world W satisfies r t0 for an initial node t 0 of the tree, and whenever any r t is true in a world U ∈ W, then U |= r s if and only if t ≤ s in T . In other words, the assertions r t partition the worlds of W in such a way that makes possibility in W look the same as in T . In a sense, the finite pre-tree T is realized as a quotient of the Kripke model W, which could have many more worlds or even infinitely many, as it does for the cases in which we are interested.
The existence of sufficient railyard labelings for a potentialist system allows us to conclude that its validities are exactly S4.
Theorem 28. Suppose that W is a potentialist system that admits a railyard labeling for every finite pre-tree T -and it suffices to handle only pre-trees with all clusters the same size and all branching clusters having the same degree-then the potentialist validities of W are exactly S4, with respect to the language in which the labeling assertions are expressed.
Proof. Note first that it is easy to see that S4 is valid in any potentialist system, since the accessibility relation is reflexive and transitive (see also [HL17, theorem 2]). The converse result, that only S4 is valid, follows from the railyard labelings as an instance of [HLL15, lemma 9] and the related general analysis there. Specifically, if a propositional modal assertion ϕ(p 0 , . . . , p n ) with propositional variables p i is not in S4, then there is a propositional Kripke model M , whose underlying frame is a finite pre-tree T , in which ϕ fails, since this collection of frames is complete for S4. Each world w ∈ M gives truth values to the propositional variables p i . By duplicating worlds if necessary, we may assume that all the clusters of T have the same size and all branching clusters branch with the same degree. Let t → r t be the railyard labeling of T for W. For each propositional variable p appearing in ϕ, let ψ p = { r t | (M, t) |= p }, which is true in W at exactly the worlds corresponding to nodes in the pre-tree for which p is true in M . One may now prove by induction on formulas φ in propositional modal logic that
whenever W is a world in W corresponding to node t in M , which is to say that W |= r t . In this way, truth in the propositional Kripke model M is simulated in the potentialist system W. In particular, since ϕ failed at a world of M , it follows that ϕ(ψ p0 , . . . , ψ pn ) fails at a world of W, and so ϕ is not valid in W.
The modal logic of arithmetic potentialism
I am now ready to prove the main results of this article. Recall that PA + is a fixed consistent c.e. extension of PA. Let us begin with an easy observation that sets the overall bounds.
Theorem 29. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA + under end-extension, the potentialist validities of any model M , with respect to assertions in the language of arithmetic L or any extension of it L + , contain S4 and are contained in S5.
Proof. The modal theory S4 is valid generally in every potentialist system, as we have noted. For the upper bound, theorem 21 provides an infinite family of independent switches, which can be turned on and off so as to realize any desired finite pattern in an end-extension. It follows by theorem 26 that the modal validities of any model are contained within S5.
Theorem 30. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA + under end-extension, if M is a model in which the universal algorithm enumerates the empty sequence, then the potentialist validities of M , with respect to sentences in the language of arithmetic, are exactly the assertions of S4.
Proof. By theorem 28, it suffices to provide railyard labelings for any finite pre-tree. Consider such a pre-tree T , such as the one pictured below in figure 2. Each world in a cluster can access all the other worlds in that cluster and any world in any higher cluster in the tree. To produce the railyard labeling, assign each node t in the tree T to an assertion r t in the language of arithmetic that makes a certain specific claim about the behavior of the universal algorithm e. Specifically, let k be such that this tree is at most k-branching, and let m be such that all the clusters have size at most m. Consider the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm e. It enumerates a finite list of numbers, and from that list we produce the subsequence of numbers consisting of those numbers less than k, which we interpret as a way of climbing the tree, a way of successively choosing amongst the branching nodes in T , so as to arrive at a particular cluster of T (ignore any additional numbers, if there are too many), plus the last number on the universal sequence that is k or larger (default to k, if there is none). By considering this final number modulo m, we may interpret it as picking a particular node in the cluster at which we arrived (and simply group together some of the residues if the cluster has fewer than m nodes). In this way, we can assign to each node t of the pre-tree T a statement r t about the nature of the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm, in such a way that a world W satisfying r t will satisfy r s just in case t ≤ s in T . The reason is that by theorem 14, any sequence in any such W can be extended by any desired finite sequence, and we can add to the given sequence as it is computed in W so as to specify in an extension U that we climb to and arrive at any desired node s in the tree. Any model M in which the universal sequence is empty will correspond to an initial node of the tree. Thus, the universal algorithm provides a labeling of any finite pre-tree, and so the potentialist modal validities of W , with respect to sentences in the language of set theory, is exactly S4.
In particular, if PA
+ is true in the standard model N, as in the central case where PA + is simply PA itself, then the modal validities of N are exactly S4 for sentences.
Theorem 31. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA + under end-extension, the potentialist validities of any model M |= PA + , with respect to assertions in the language of arithmetic allowing parameters from M , are exactly the assertions of S4. Indeed, for every model M , there is a single parameter u ∈ M , such that the modal validities for arithmetic potentialism over M , with respect to assertions in the language of arithmetic using parameter u only, is exactly S4.
Proof. If parameters are allowed, we can carry out the previous argument in any model of PA + , whether or not the universal sequence is empty in some model. Simply let u be the length of the sequence enumerated by the universal algorithm in M , and consider the universal sequence as it might be extended beyond u. The idea is that beyond u, we again have the tree of possibilities, and we can perform the labeling of finite pre-trees as in theorem 30 by simply ignoring the first u terms of the universal algorithm, leading to a new railyard assignment t → r t over M , where r t makes reference to parameter u. In this way, we will get Val (M, L(u)) = S4, as desired.
So we've seen how to ensure S4 for sentences in some models of arithmetic, showing that the lower bound of theorem 29 is sharp. Let me now prove that the upper bound is sharp, by finding a model of PA + whose potentialist validities are exactly S5.
A model of arithmetic M |= PA + satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle, if σ → σ is true in M for every arithmetic sentence σ. Thus, every sentence that is possibly necessary over M is already true in M . In other words, M satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle if and only if S5 is valid in M with respect to sentences in the language of arithmetic. Since theorem 4 shows that σ is equivalent to σ for arithmetic assertions σ, the arithmetic maximality principle is equivalently formulated using either end-extensions or arbitrary extensions, and in the next section we will see that it is also equivalently formulated using conservative end-extensions σ → σ or with computably saturated end-extensions σ → σ, and others. Since the arithmetic maximality principle is stated in terms of how a model M relates to its extensions in the potentialist system of all models of arithmetic, it might seem at first that it should be a property of the model, rather than merely of the theory of the model. Nevertheless, the arithmetic maximality principle is revealed by the theory of the model. Theorem 32. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA + under endextension, if a model M satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle and M ≡ N , then N also satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle.
Proof. If M satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle, then in light of theorem 4, this is visible is the theory of M as follows. Since the maximality principle asserts σ → σ for every sentence σ, it is necessary and sufficient that if there is a natural number n such that for all k the statement Con(PA + k + ¬ Con(PA + n + ¬σ)) is in the theory, then σ is also in the theory.
Let me show that indeed there are models of the arithmetic maximality principle. It turns out that these are simply the models satisfying a maximal Σ 1 theory. A maximal consistent Σ 1 theory over PA + is a theory T consisting of Σ 1 sentences only, such that PA + + T is consistent and T is maximal among such theories. In particular, for such a theory T any Σ 1 assertion that is consistent with PA + + T is already an axiom of T . It is easy to construct such theories, simply by enumerating all Σ 1 assertions and then including them one at time, as long as this is consistent over PA + . Indeed, every consistent Σ 1 theory over PA + is contained in maximal consistent Σ 1 theory over PA + .
Theorem 33. For any model of arithmetic M |= PA + , the following are equivalent. (1) M fulfills the arithmetic maximality principle.
(2) The Σ 1 theory of M is a maximal consistent Σ 1 theory over PA + . These models M have potentialist validities described by
Proof. Suppose a model of arithmetic M satisfies a maximal Σ 1 theory over PA + . If M |= σ, then there is an end-extension N |= PA + satisfying σ, which means that N |= ¬ Con(PA + k + ¬σ) for some standard finite k by lemma 3. This is a Σ 1 assertion that is true in N , where all the Σ 1 assertions true in M remain true. By maximality, therefore, this inconsistency statement must already be true in M . This implies σ is necessary over M and in particular M |= σ, verifying this instance of the maximality principle.
Conversely, if M satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle, then let me show that the Σ 1 theory of M is a maximal extension of PA + . Suppose that σ is a Σ 1 assertion that is consistent with PA + plus the Σ 1 theory of M . By lemma 2, this implies M |= σ, and consequently M |= σ, since Σ 1 assertions, once true, are necessarily true in all further extensions. By the arithmetic maximality principle, therefore, M |= σ, and so its Σ 1 theory is maximal.
For the final statement of the theorem, note that we have already established that Val(M, L(M )) = S4 for every model of arithmetic, and the arithmetic maximality principle in M amounts precisely to Val(M, L) = S5.
It may seem reasonable to expect that any given model of arithmetic M can be extended so as to achieve a maximal Σ 1 theory and therefore also the arithmetic maximality principle. Perhaps one might hope, for example, to extend the model one step at a time, making an additional Σ 1 sentence true each time. Theorem 34 shows that this expectation is fine, if one seeks only to find an extension of the original model, rather than an end-extension. But meanwhile, corollary 36 shows that the expectation is wrong for end-extensions: some models of arithmetic have no end-extension to a model with a maximal Σ 1 theory and hence no end-extension to a model of the arithmetic maximality principle.
Theorem 34. Every model of arithmetic M |= PA + has an extension (not necessarily an end-extension) to a model of arithmetic N |= PA + with a maximal Σ 1 theory, which therefore satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle.
Proof. Consider any model of arithmetic M |= PA + . Let T 0 be the theory PA + plus the atomic diagram of M . Enumerate the Σ 1 sentences as σ 0 , σ 1 , σ 2 and so on. Build a new theory from T 0 by adding σ n at stage n, if this is consistent. Let T be the resulting theory. This is consistent, since it was consistent at each stage. So it has a model N |= T , which can be taken as an extension of M since T includes the atomic diagram of M . To see that the Σ 1 theory of N is maximal, consider any Σ 1 sentence σ, which is σ n for some n and therefore considered at stage n of the theory construction. If σ is not true in N , then it was not added to the theory T , and this must have been because it was inconsistent with PA + plus the atomic diagram of M plus the earlier part of T . But whichever finite part of the atomic diagram that was needed for the inconsistency amounts to a Σ 1 statement that is true in M and hence also in N . So we've proved that any Σ 1 sentence that is consistent with the Σ 1 theory of N over PA + is already true in N , as desired. ′ is not in the standard system of M . We claim that M is not a model of the arithmetic maximality principle. By Lessan's theorem, we know that the ∆ 0 definable elements of M are coinitial in the standard cut of M . By overspill, we know that M |= Con(PA + k ) for some nonstandard k, and by making k smaller, if necessary, we may assume that k is ∆ 0 -definable in M and hence the output in M of some standard finite program p on input 0; it suffices in this argument for k to be merely Σ 1 -definable. Consider the assertion, "the number k which is the output of program p on input 0 satisfies ¬ Con(PA + k )." This is a Σ 1 sentence, which is not true in M , but could become true in some end-extension of M , since by the incompleteness theorem we can always end-extend any model of PA + to make ¬ Con(PA + k ) for any nonstandard k. This is a violation of the arithmetic maximality principle in M .
A second, alternative argument proceeds from a theorem of Adamowicz [Ada91] (see also [ACFLM16, section 5]), which says that 0 ′ is Turing computable from any maximal Σ 1 theory. If a model of arithmetic M |= PA + satisfies the arithmetic maximality principle, then its Σ 1 theory is maximal over PA + and so 0 ′ must be in the standard system of M .
Because the existence of 0 ′ in the standard system is expressible in the extension modality L by the method of theorem 7, perhaps it would be possible to use Lessan's or Adamowicz's methods to answer question 12.
Corollary 36. Some models of arithmetic have no end-extension to a model of the arithmetic maximality principle. Indeed, if 0 ′ is not in the standard system of M , then M has no end-extension to a model of the arithmetic maximality principle.
Proof. To see that some models of arithmetic lack 0 ′ in their standard systems, consider the computable tree of attempts to build a complete consistent Henkin theory extending PA + plus the assertion that a new constant c is infinite (to ensure that the model is nonstandard). It follows by the low basis theorem that there is a low branch, and the Henkin model M arising from such a branch will have an elementary diagram of low complexity. It follows that every set in the standard system of M will be low, and in particular, 0 ′ / ∈ SSy(M ). Since this is preserved to end-extensions, such a model has no end-extension with the arithmetic maximality principle by theorem 35.
Volodya Shavrukov has pointed out in an email message to me that not having an end-extension with the maximality principle is strictly stronger than omitting 0 ′ from the standard system, for he constructed a model of arithmetic M whose Σ 1 -definable elements are coinitial in the standard cut, which ensures that there is no end-extension of the maximality principle, yet 0 ′ is coded in M . This example also shows that one cannot replace ∆ 0 -definable in Lessan's theorem with Σ 1 -definable.
Question 37. Can we characterize the models of arithmetic that admit an endextension to a model of the arithmetic maximality principle? In other words, which models M have an end-extension to a model N with a maximal Σ 1 theory?
The situation is reminiscent of the maximality principle for forcing (see [Ham03; SV02] ), which asserts that S5 is valid with respect to the forcing modality for sentences in the language of set theory σ → σ, or in other words that every forceably necessary statement σ is already true. The similarity is that while ZFC plus this maximality principle is equiconsistent with ZFC, nevertheless [Ham03, theorem 7] shows that it is not true that one can always force it over any model of ZFC. Rather, a model of ZFC has a forcing extension realizing the forcing maximality principle if and only if it has a fully reflecting cardinal V δ ≺ V .
2 Question 37 is asking essentially for the arithmetic analogue of this.
Although we have proved that the sentential validities Val (M, L) of a model of arithmetic M are trapped between S4 and S5, with both of these endpoints being realized, it is not clear exactly which modal theories can be realized. Volodya Shavrukov has suggested that we might approach question 38 by considering whether there can be a model of arithmetic M whose Σ 1 theory is not 2 Note that this particular issue appears to be missed in [SV02] , where [SV02, theorem 30] claims, incorrectly, that one can always force the c.c.c. maximality principle, that is, without using any reflecting cardinal, and similarly in the proofs of [SV02, theorem 27,31,37], which define an iteration by inquiring at each stage whether a given statement, of arbitrary complexity, is forceable; this is not possible without a truth predicate. These latter proofs can be repaired by using the reflecting cardinal method as in [Ham03] .
maximal, but which nevertheless satisfies all the sentences that hold in every Σ 1 maximal extension of M . Such a model would validate σ → σ for Σ 1 sentences σ, and one could then aim to validate ϕ → ϕ for all ϕ in the language of arithmetic without validating S5.
Arithmetic potentialism for other modalities
Let me now extend the results of the previous section to the other arithmetic potentialist modalities, such as , n and n , as well as the additional modalities , and , which I shall introduce later in this section. Much of the analysis of the end-extension modality applies to the case of arbitrary extensions .
Theorem 39. In the potentialist system consisting of the models of PA + under the extension modality , the validities of any model M |= PA + , with respect to arithmetic assertions allowing parameters from M , are exactly the assertions of S4. Indeed, for every M there is u ∈ M , the length of the universal finite sequence in M , such that the validities of M , with respect to arithmetic assertions using parameter u, are exactly S4.
Proof. The point is that the railyard labelings provided in the proofs of theorems 30 and 31 work also with the arbitrary extension modal operator . Suppose that M is any model of PA + in which the universal algorithm enumerates the empty sequence, and that T is a finite pre-tree. Let t → r t be the railyard labeling of T described in the proofs of theorems 30 and 31 (so r t may have parameter u, the length of the universal finite sequence in M , if this is non-zero). Since the statements r t were expressed in the language of arithmetic, it follows from lemma 2 that r t and r t agree, and so this same labeling is a railyard labeling of T for the extension modality just as much as for the end-extension modality.
The bounds on Val (M, L) provided by theorem 39 are sharp, in the sense that Val (M, L) = S5 in any model of the arithmetic maximality principle, since we have observed that this is equivalently formulated using or ; and Val (M, L) = S4 in any model where the universal sequence is empty (or has standard finite length), since then one doesn't need the parameter u as it is absolutely definable.
The argument used in the proof of theorem 39 suggests but does not quite establish that the modal validities for and , with respect to assertions in the language of arithmetic, are the same in any model of arithmetic. So we'd like to ask that now, a question that is closely related to question 8.
Either outcome would be extremely interesting, either a model whose validities differed between and or a proof that they must always agree.
6.2. Σ n -elementary extensions. Consider next the extension modalities n and n , where we insist that the extensions are also Σ n -elementary. Note the special case = 0 and = 0 , since every extension is Σ 0 -elementary.
Theorem 41. In either of the potentialist systems consisting of the models of PA + under Σ n -elementary end-extensions n or under arbitrary Σ n -elementary extensions n , respectively, the potentialist validities of any model M |= PA + , with respect to assertions in the language of arithmetic allowing parameters from M , are exactly the assertions of S4. Indeed, for every model M , there is a single parameter u ∈ M , such that the potentialist validities over M , with respect to assertions in the language of arithmetic using parameter u only, is exactly S4.
Proof. Consider any finite pre-tree T and let r → r t be the railyard labeling of T as in the proof of theorem 30, except using the oracle universal algorithmê from the proof of theorem 18. The parameter u is simply the length of this universal finite sequence as computed in M . The algorithm uses oracle 0 (n) , as defined in whichever model it is employed. Since the content of 0 (n) is preserved and extended by Σ n -elementary extensions, it follows that the previous parts of the computation remain the same as one moves to an accessible world. Thus, it follows just as earlier that this is indeed a railyard labeling of T with respect to n and to n , and so the validities for assertions in L(u) are contained within S4 as claimed.
Consider next the arithmetic Σ n -maximality principle, which holds in a model M |= PA + when the implication n n σ → σ holds there for every sentence σ in the language of arithmetic. The analogues of lemmas 2 and 3 hold for Σ nelementary extensions. Namely, a model of arithmetic M |= PA + satisfies n ϕ(a) for an arithmetic assertion ϕ just in case it satisfies Con(Tr n +PA + k + ϕ(a)) for every standard finite k, and this is also equivalent to n ϕ(a), and the proof is just as in lemma 2, except that one includes the Σ n diagram Tr n of the model in the theory, to ensure that the extension is Σ n -elementary. For this reason, n ϕ is equivalent to n ϕ for arithmetic assertions ϕ, and consequently the maximality principle is equivalently formulated either as n n σ → σ, with end-extensions, or as n n σ → σ, with arbitrary extensions.
Theorem 42. For any model of arithmetic M |= PA + and any standard finite natural number n, the following are equivalent.
(1) M fulfills the arithmetic Σ n maximality principle.
(2) The Σ n+1 theory of M is a maximal consistent Σ n+1 theory over PA + . These models M have potentialist validities described by
Proof. Suppose a model of arithmetic M satisfies a maximal Σ n+1 theory over PA + . If M |= n n σ, then there is a Σ n -elementary end-extension N |= PA + satisfying n σ, which means that N |= ¬ Con(Tr n +PA + k + ¬σ) for some standard finite k by the Σ n -elementary analogue of lemma 3. This is a Σ n+1 assertion that is true in N , where all the Σ n+1 assertions true in M remain true. By maximality, therefore, this inconsistency statement must already be true in M . This implies σ is n -necessary over M and in particular M |= σ, verifying this instance of the Σ n maximality principle.
Conversely, if M satisfies the arithmetic Σ n maximality principle, then let me show that the Σ n+1 theory of M is a maximal extension of PA + . Suppose that σ is a Σ n+1 assertion that is consistent with PA + plus the Σ n+1 theory of M . By the Σ n -elementary analogue of lemma 2, this implies M |= n σ, and consequently M |= n n σ, since Σ n+1 assertions, once true in a Σ n -elementary extension, are necessarily true in all Σ n -elementary extensions. By the arithmetic Σ n maximality principle, therefore, M |= σ, and so its Σ n+1 theory is maximal.
For the final statement of the theorem, note that we have already established that Val An extension M ⊆ N is conservative, if whenever A ⊆ N is definable in N from parameters in N , then A ∩ M is definable in M using parameters in M . A model M is computably saturated (also known formerly as recursively saturated ), if every computable 1-type over M , with finitely many parameters from M , which is consistent with the elementary diagram of M , is realized in M . We shall usually consider and only when M itself is computably saturated (or the standard model), since otherwise they trivialize. As a memory aid for the symbols, imagine that the conservative extension symbol resembles a collared white shirt and tie-conservative attire-and the shaded-in part of suggests that all computable types over the model are filled-in or realized.
The key observation to make concerning these new modalities is that many of the arguments of the earlier sections of this paper, we built extensions of a model of arithmetic M by taking the Henkin model of a certain theory that was definable inside M . All such extensions N arising by this means will be conservative, because any class that is definable in N is a class that M has access to in virtue of its having the entire elementary diagram of N . In particular, the universal algorithm result of theorem 14 works with conservative extensions, and this will enable the key arguments of the potentialist analysis to go through.
Theorem 43. For the conservative end-extension modality, with operators , :
(1) ϕ(a) is equivalent to ϕ(a), to ϕ(a) and to the other statements of lemma 2, for arithmetic assertions ϕ. (2) ϕ(a) is equivalent to ϕ(a), to ϕ(a) and to the other statements of lemma 3, for arithmetic assertions ϕ. Regarding the computably saturated end-extension modality , the key observation is that if a model of arithmetic M is computably saturated, then the models N arising as Henkin models for theories in M will also be computably saturated, since their elementary diagram is a definable class in M , and any model interpreted in a computably saturated model is itself computably saturated. For this reason, the analysis I have just given for conservative end-extensions carries through almost identically for the potentialist system consisting of the computably saturated models of arithmetic under the end-extension modality , yielding:
Theorem 44. Concerning the computably saturated end-extension modality, with operators and :
(1) ϕ(a) is equivalent, in a computably saturated model, to ϕ(a), to ϕ(a) and to the other statements of lemma 2, for arithmetic assertions ϕ. (2) ϕ(a) is equivalent, in a computably saturated model, to ϕ(a), to ϕ(a) and to the other statements of lemma 3, for arithmetic assertions ϕ. (3) The arithmetic maximality principal σ → σ is equivalently formulated, in computably saturated models, with computably saturated end-extensions as σ → σ. (4) The universal algorithm of theorem 14 realizes its extension property, in computably saturated models, with computably saturated end-extensions. (5) For any computably saturated model of arithmetic M |= PA + , the potentialist validities of the computably saturated end-extension modality obey This is an open-ended question, which would seem to admit many partial results by considering merely some of the modalities. I invite the reader to join the project and help sort out these various matters.
Volodya Shavrukov has mentioned that his article [Sha16] , although it does not mention modal logic explicitly, can be seen as concerned with the arithmetic potentialism of nonstandard models of true arithmetic under arbitrary extensions preserving a distinguished nonstandard element.
Philosophical remarks
Let me conclude with some philosophical remarks. This paper illustrates a common pattern of exchange between philosophy and mathematics, by which a philosophical idea inspires a mathematical analysis, which in turn raises further philosophical issues, and so on in a fruitful cycle. After all, the philosophy of potentialism originates in antiquity in the classical dispute between actual and potential infinity, and current work spans the range from philosophy to mathematics and back again. Øystein Linnebo and Stewart Shapiro [Lin13; LS17] have emphasized the modal nature of potentialism, viewing it as providing a hierarchy of universe fragments, which therefore provide a natural context for modal assertions. In [HL17] , Linnebo and I developed a general model-theoretic account of potentialism and used it to find the exact modal commitments of various kinds of set-theoretic potentialism, including set-theoretic rank potentialism (true in all larger V β ); Grothendieck-Zermelo potentialism (true in all larger V κ for inaccessible cardinals κ); transitive-set potentialism (true in all larger transitive sets); countable-transitive-model potentialism (true in all larger countable transitive models of ZFC); countable-model potentialism (true in all larger countable models of ZFC); and others. In [HL08] , Löwe and I found the modal validities of forcing potentialism. In [HW17] , Woodin and I found the modal validities of top-extensional set-theoretic potentialism. Visser and Shavrukov [Vis98] found the validities of relative interpretability, including arithmetic extension modalities, and in this article I similarly find the exact modal commitments of various kinds of arithmetic potentialism.
Radical branching S4 Figure 3 . Differing potentialist conceptions So let me discuss a few philosophical issues I find to be raised by all this mathematical analysis. A central feature now made plain is the fact that different potentialist systems can exhibit very different modal theories of validity. The Grothendieck-Zermelo set-theoretic potentialism analyzed in [HL17] , for example, with universe fragments being the inaccessible rank-initial segments V κ of the set-theoretic universe, validates exactly S4.3; the forcing potentialism of [HL08] validates exactly S4.2; and the top-extensional set-theoretic potentialism analyzed in [HW17] validates exactly S4.
These different modal theories are the direct result of the fundamentally different character of potentiality offered by these various potentialist systems. One generally has S4.3 in a potentialist system when the worlds are linearly ordered; S4.2 when they are directed; and S4 when they have the character of a tree, with branching possibility. (But please remember that lower bounds are cheap; to establish these theories as upper bounds, in contrast, is often a subtler matter.)
The philosophical point to be made is that in order to be satisfactory, an account of potentialism must address these fundamentally different kinds of potentiality. The naive potentialist account of arithmetic potentialism-the view that one has at any moment only some or boundedly many of the natural numbers, but one can always have more as time proceeds-is no longer sufficient, because it doesn't address the critical issue of branching possibility. Are we to expect the universe as it unfolds to have a character of linear inevitability, where the numbers pile on in a unique coherent manner, converging to a final model? Or shall we expect the unexpected, with the universe unfolding in a process of radical branching possibility? These notions of potentiality have fundamentally different characters.
Indeed, I should like to argue that the convergent forms of potentialism are much closer to actualism than are the more radically potentialist theories, and I regard convergent potentialism as implicitly actualist. The reason is that if the universe fragments of one's potentialist system are mutually coherent with one another, forming a coherent system in the sense of [HL17] , then there is a unique limit model to which the system is converging, and there seems to be very little at stake in the ontological dispute concerning the actual existence of this limit model. What does it matter if the potential objects that might come to exist do not yet actually exist, if the way that they will come to exist is unique and deterministic? To experience potentiality in convergent potentialism is simply to wait for the inevitable. In a convergent potentialist system, after all, the potentialist can refer to truth in the limit model, without having that model in his or her ontology, by means of the potentialist translation: one translates existence assertions ∃x for the limit model as ∃x for the universe fragments (see [HL17,  theorem 1] and also [Lin13] ; a similar idea underlies theorem 10 in this article). For convergent potentialism, therefore, it is as though the limit model actually exists, for all the purposes of speaking about what is true or false there. But it is not just about making truth and falsity assertions for the limit model; rather, with convergent potentialism, it is that the limit model has an implicit existence whose fundamental nature is determined by and definable in the potentialist system, for we can interpret the full actualist universe inside the potentialist ontology. This is the sense in which I regard convergent potentialism as implicitly actualist. In convergent potentialism, the full actual limit universe supervenes on the potentialist ontology.
A more radical form of potentialism, in contrast, arises when there is truly branching possibility, statements that could become true, but might not. For this kind of potentialism, one is living in a universe fragment, and the question of what might become true and verified in a larger universe fragment depends on precisely how the universe unfolds. Will the next number on the universal finite sequence be even or odd? Will the Rosser sentence be true or its negation? It depends on how the universe unfolds.
Woodin [Woo11] uses this feature explicitly to make a point about free will and determinism. Suppose I fix the universal algorithm of theorem 14 and announce that it will predict your free-will choices. Am I wrong? You freely choose a finite sequence of numbers, any sequence at all, and we run the program. If time is extended into the right universe, my program will correctly enumerate your sequence there, fulfilling my claim of it as a predictor. And we can do it again from that point, as much as we want: you freely pick a finite extension of the sequence, and in the right extension of the universe, the predictor will again be right.
I believe that end-extensional arithmetic potentialism can shed light on the philosophy of finitism and even ultrafinitism. To be sure, I do not expect to engage the ultrafinitist in an analysis of nonstandard models of arithmetic, since such models and even the standard model of arithmetic do not have a real mathematical existence for the ultrafinitist. Rather, what I am proposing is to use the potentialist system in order to shed light on what are the commitments of ultrafinitism, for it is often not as clear as one might hope to come to an understanding of exactly what ultrafinitism is. This is an analysis of ultrafinitism undertaken by and for the actualists, to help them understand ultrafinitism, much as one might use classical logic when analyzing or comparing the power of various systems of intuitionist logic.
The main point is that important features of the potentialist system appear to be shared with assertions that one sometimes hears from ultrafinitists. For the ultrafinitist, the universe of natural numbers starts out perfectly clear with the numbers 0, 1, 2 and so on, but as time proceeds there is increasing hesitancy concerning extremely large numbers; it is as though the numbers get less definite as one proceeds; one can often describe much larger numbers with a comparatively small definition, but the number being defined would be so vast that the ultrafinitist is hesitant to agree that it actually exists. Thus, the ultrafinitist appears to have something like an initial segment of the universe of natural numbers, a realm of feasibility. Perhaps this realm is even closed under successor, or perhaps not, but many ultrafinitists are reluctant to assert that there is a largest natural number, and it is because of this kind of issue that it is often difficult to say exactly what it is that the ultrafinitist holds.
My idea is that every model of arithmetic M can be seen as providing an ultrafinitistic context, a realm of feasibility, with respect to its end-extensions N , in that the objects of M are smaller in a very robust way than the additional objects of N , yet still they obey in M the attractive and familiar mathematical properties. In particular, since M is closed under successor and the other elementary arithmetic operations (but definitely not necessarily under all arithmetically definable operations in N ), what we gain is a robust, coherent and mathematically precise way of understanding the nature of ultrafinitist worlds. On this account, the finitist and ultrafinitist perspective is that the full entirety of the natural numbers is so vast that it has these difficult-to-describe cuts corresponding to partial universe fragments, which are closed under successor and much more, but which can be viewed as a lower realm of feasibility. Thus, one doesn't view the nonstandard models as enlargements of the 'standard' model, but rather one views them as ultrafinitist approximations of the full model of natural numbers yet to be constructed on top.
The view is not that the finitist or the ultrafinitist are speaking about nonstandard models of PA, which of course they are not. Rather, the view is that the situation arising from the potentialist account of these models seems to exhibit many of the features concerning arithmetic and the nature of arithmetic truth and number existence assertions that the finitist and the ultrafinitist seem to describe, and for this reason by studying the nature of the potentialist system, we might come to a better understanding of those views.
Thus, I propose to view the philosophy of ultrafinitism in modal terms as a form of potentialism. For this kind of ultrafinitism, we would have a hierarchy of realms of feasibility, about which we could make modal assertions connecting them. Further, this picture leads directly to the question of branching possibility in ultrafinitism, and we would thus seem to have distinct varieties of ultrafinitism, depending on how one answers. Is it part of the ultrafinitist ontology or not that the nature of the numbers, as we produce more and more of them, are determinate with linear inevitability? Or might we discover different arithmetic truths if the numbers are revealed differently? Linear inevitability ultrafinitism would have modal validities S4.3, but would, as I argued above, be much closer to non-ultrafinitist positions concerning the limit model. Radical branching ultrafinitism, in contrast, would exhibit true branching possibility as the realms of feasibility unfold, validating only S4.
The potentialist version of ultrafinitism need not necessarily be arithmetic endextensional potentialism, for one can imagine that the ultrafinitist realms of feasibility do not necessarily constitute an initial segment of the larger realms. For example, it is conceivable that a modal ultrafinitist could hold that 2 2 100 comes into existence at an earlier stage of feasibility than some of the numbers smaller than it, simply because it is easier to describe this number-it has low Kolmogorov complexity-than some of the numbers smaller than it, which can have enormous complexity or an effectively random nature, say, for their digits.
Turning now to another philosophical topic, logically inclined mathematicians sometimes inquire: if a theory is inconsistent, but there is no short proof of a contradiction from the theory, can one still rely on it when using only short proofs? The potentialist framework provides an interesting take on this, for one can imagine that a theory is consistent in a universe fragment, but potentially inconsistent only in a larger fragment. Indeed, this phenomenon is fundamental to the proof of the universal algorithm, since if stage n of that algorithm is successful, then PA kn−1 is consistent in that model, but it can become inconsistent in an end-extension. The smaller world can usefully build a model of a theory, even though the larger model cannot really do this sensibly, when the theory becomes inconsistent. In this sense, the smaller universe fragments actually have access to a broader number of possible worlds; they haven't yet been closed off by selecting a particular universe extension. Such a perspective allows one to look upon paraconsistency through a potentialist lens, which provides in effect a hierarchy of realms of consistency and thereby controls logical explosion.
Finally, let me briefly discuss how arithmetic potentialism relates to the interpretation of Maddy's MAXIMIZE principle [Mad97] in arithmetic foundations. Maddy directs us by her maxim to adopt foundational theories that maximize the range of mathematical possibility. A straightforward interpretation of this in arithmetic would seem to lead us to models of the arithmetic maximality principle, where every sentence σ that could become necessarily true is already true. By theorem 33, these are precisely the models exhibiting a maximal Σ 1 arithmetic theory, making a maximal assertion of existence in arithmetic. The problem for Maddy, however, is that all such theories necessarily make numerous inconsistency assertions. In particular, they all think ¬ Con(PA) and much more. Since they have maximized the collection of sentences σ for which σ holds, they have also maximized the collection of true sentences σ for which PA k + ¬σ is inconsistent. But Maddy doesn't usually seem to take her MAXIMIZE principle to compel one towards holding that most mathematical theories are inconsistent.
Maddy, of course, is implementing her principle in set theory, rather than arithmetic, and she proposes it as a principled way to justify various large cardinal axioms. The point I make here is that adding new large cardinal axioms in set theory leads usually to the negation of Σ 0 1 statements, since they cause consistency statements to become true rather than inconsistency statements. So perhaps the large-cardinal set-theorist reply is that we should be minimizing the Σ 0 1 theory, or in other words, maximizing the Π 0 1 theory. This makes sense if one thinks that having a shorter model of arithmetic is better: it is closer to being standard.
